Archive for March, 2007

My Elizabeth Edwards Story

Thursday, March 22nd, 2007

Several commentators seem to have personal Elizabeth Edwards stories tonight. Keith Olbermann’s is the time she called in to say that some of her fondest memories of her deceased teenage son was when they watched Keith on ESPN. So much so that every time she sees Keith now, she gets a warm feeling about her son. David Weinberger explains why she’s so good at making lemonade, at his first Huffington Post: “She is the type of person who talks to the person behind her on line at the grocery, which I believe in the Northeast has the status of a rarely-prosecuted misdemeanor.”

My story is from last year’s Personal Democracy Conference, when our host, Andrew Rasiej, interviewed her. Replying to the question about money and politics, her instant and candid response was,

“Of course we have to do something about it. There’s too much friggin’ money in politics!”

What’s your Elizabeth Edwards story? Comments are hosed here, but maybe the folks at Personal Democracy will put up a page for them.

You really should go to this year’s PDF Conference on May 18 here in NYC. Great time of the year. I’m encouraging the intrepid Damien Mulley to come over from the People’s Republic of Cork.

The People Law trumps the Power Law

Monday, March 19th, 2007

There are five principles I’m playing with lately:

  1. The size of your audience confers limited power
  2. A network’s value is the square of its nodes (Metcalfe)
  3. Network nodes are significant only when they’re verbose
  4. Most conversation is among nearby nodes
  5. Only interactions count, and the richest count most

1. The size of your audience confers limited power

We’re so accustomed to broadcast economics that the Power Law seems like it’s how influence should be measured. But I don’t think that’s how things work any more, out here in the wild west of the read-write web. Here’s the Power Law as depicted at Wikipedia:

The biggest audience is reading a few writers on the left side of the chart. Readership per writer goes downhill fast from there. As David Weinberger says, “Everyone’s famous for 15 people.” But what’s the importance of a big audience of passive readers? In the age of Big Media, It was the only thing we could count, but those times are months behind us. In social networks, everyone is a potential participant, but if your 10,000 readers leave 100 comments but don’t take your ideas and run with them, so what? Leaving a comment is a lot like leaving, because Embrace is not the same as Extend.

2. A network’s value is the square of its nodes (Metcalfe)

The math is controversial, but the principle is sound. Literally. If your nodes don’t sound off, they’re useless, so rule 3 is key:

3. Network nodes are significant only when they’re verbose

When you consider all the ways that a person might reach out to another, reading and commenting seems like thin tea. Face-to-Face is the real point of community, as Kathy Sierra wrote at her Creating Passionate Users blog: Face-to-Face Trumps Twitter, Blogs, Video…

She even provided a diagram:

Kathy’s subject was why people bothered to go to the SXSW Conference when there are so many other ways to connect. It’s because people need their people fix, and even for these hackers, virtual doesn’t hack it.

4. Most conversation is among nearby nodes

Since it’s interactions we’re after, we need a kind of calculus of relationship, perhaps as revolutionary as Newton’s discoveries that brought logic to orbiting planets and arcing cannonballs. Here’s my depiction from the Dean campaign:

Everybody engages a network gradually and experiences it mostly through their friends. If your network has mechanisms for encouraging outreach and constant chatter among nodes, it will grow. News and juicy tidbits flow down the nervous system and questions and energy flow back. That sound you hear is the twittering of the network’s nervous system. Every political campaign is learning the same lesson in this transformative election cycle: The movement’s not about the candidate, but about the conversation. or,

It’s not about the Twit, it’s about the Twitter

5. Only interactions count, and the richest count most

Most of the population of “interactors” is out there on the long tail of the Power Curve. But to We The People out here, the arcane and convoluted ramblings of the pundits fall on deaf ears. What we care about is learning something we don’t know from someone a little closer to the action, and pushing our unique point of view back in toward the center of the movement. Lather, rinse, repeat.

So let’s put that silly Power Law to rest at last: it’s a monument to outmoded metrics. The People Law is the one we’ve been conforming to all our lives: Where there’s folk, there’s fire.

Nobody asks the C-130 Drivers

Sunday, March 18th, 2007

The Uninformed, leading the Unwilling, toward the Impossible

That’s what I see when I listen in on the tedious debate over the Iraq war, so reminiscent of Vietnam. I wonder what would the Cable News Networks report if they conducted a survey of the Wallace Beerys of the Air Force, we the C-130 Drivers. That sensibility is awakened again by this front page article in the New York Times (free subscription required), citing how their different experiences in Vietnam may have formed the views of Senators Hagel and McCain on Iraq:

Different Paths From Vietnam to War in Iraq

Senator Chuck Hagel spent 13 months as a lowly grunt in the Mekong Delta in the deadliest period of the Vietnam War. He saw the horror of war from the bottom up — men sheared in half by explosives, half-decapitated by sniper fire, bleeding to death in the gloomy swelter of the jungle. Thirty years later, he came to believe he had been used.

Senator John McCain was shot down 3,500 feet above Hanoi on a bombing run one month into his tour. He spent five and a half years as a prisoner of war; he was held in solitary confinement, tortured, beaten until he could not stand. An admiral’s son and a Navy pilot, he came to believe, like many pilots, that the war had been winnable, if only it had been fought right.

Nobody asks the C-130 Drivers

We Airlift people were not quite so egotistical to call ourselves C-130 pilots. “Drivers” was more like it. We knew a lot about the war-on-the-ground because we visited it every day, intimately. We flew 12 hours a day, landing at 8-10 little airstrips, offloading ammo, supplies, people and hope. We routinely transported U.S. and South Vietnamese troops, both the new and optimistic and the used and wounded, plus Vietnamese “civilians”. We never knew whether the Vietnamese we carried were inspired by our cause or committed to our death. And we knew we were transporting both types. They were vastly outnumbered by the Vietnamese who didn’t know or care about the sides. They simply endured the current war as their ancestors had put up with whichever war was being waged at the time.
Our temporary assignments were to Cam Ranh Bay or Tuy Hoa Air Bases, which were also home to some seriously egotistical fighter pilots (is there any more egotistical force than fighter pilots? Not likely). These paragons of American testosterone and eye-hand coordination simply could not believe that we routinely landed and re-supplied the places that they bombed and strafed, with appropriate temerity and the virtue of about 3500 feet of vertical separation. 3500 feet AGL was usually enough, but not for John McCain in his first month, in the north, where we would never go.

The Spectrum of American Illusion (Geopolitically speaking)

Americans, like all people, love extremes. Today, at one extreme, we have (mostly) prosperous Americans who, regretting they are not more influential, are amazed that their fellow Americans do not possess the collective will to stay the course and finish what they just know is possible: we should impose our country’s military might (well, the might of 150,000 of us) to force 27 million Iraqis to just get along and forget a thousand years of Sunni-Shi’ite conflict.

On the other extreme, we have a lot of people who are so unwilling to deal with conflict that they think the world will magically leave us alone, provided we have the will and wisdom to not be violent, thus reversing every indicator of human experience.

Why ask the C-130 Drivers?

Even though every military expert agrees that there could never have been a Vietnam effort without the prodigious cargo-hauling contribution of the Lockheed C-130, I don’t think anyone has bothered to conduct a systematic survey of Vietnam C-130 crewmembers to archive what we learned as we “hauled trash” hither and yon along the long breadth and slight width of South Vietnam.

I believe that such a survey would reveal a consensus that we have got to be kidding ourselves in Iraq. Winning against an insurgency is a lot like capturing the heart of someone you can’t live without, when the magic isn’t there for them: It’s theoretically possible but statistically nonexistent.

OK, let’s explore a (typically) cynical C-130 pilot’s view of the experiences of Hagel and McCain. The above-cited NYTimes article is the first time I realized McCain had been shot down in the first month of his one-year tour.

That’s a red flag right there and I believe that a lot of experienced Vietnam types would agree. Welcome, Johnny, into the first 30 days of your Vietnam Adventure Camp. We hardly knew ye, and you never had a chance to deal with the reality of it all. As a fighter jock sleeping on an aircraft carrier every night, you were unlikely to grasp the big picture in a year, but there was no way you got it in your first month.

Any one of us who had been shot down so early and tested so rigorously would never have been able to perceive the absurdity of it all. Now that I know that John McCain was such a neophyte upon capture, I cannot take his views on Vietnam seriously. I honor and revere his experience: one that, I am sure, I would not have met as bravely or as resolutely.

John McCain is an expert on what it’s like to be captured a few weeks into his otherwise glamorous role as a Navy fighter pilot. but he’s no expert on the Vietnam experience. Though I never experienced a fraction of the pain imposed on Senator McCain, I am, relatively speaking, an expert on the reality of the South Vietnamese experience which was, I assert, the point of the entire sordid exercise.

And that’s the point of all this. We haven’t lost in Iraq, we’ve simply taken on a project that we never could have won. That truth brings on board a more important truth: If you’ve never experienced combat, yet you still embrace the undefined “victory-in-Iraq” notion, you are a fool.

If, however, you’ve suffered the slings and arrows of combat, let’s assess the realities of Iraq with the benefit of the hard-won filters we gained from Vietnam. Donald Trump is precisely right in this interview with Wolf Blitzer, but everything he says was knowable four years ago.

Chuck Hagel saw the whole mess, up close and personal. I’ll trust the opinion of a grunt on the ground for a year over that of a flyboy who never got close to the real mess we make every time we launch an elective war.